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Haimbaugh: Protecting the Seas from Nuclear Pollution

PROTECTING THE SEAS FROM
NUCLEAR POLLUTION
GEORGE

D.

HAIMBAUGH, JR.*

With increased competing demands for a decreasing amount of
available land, the United States is again looking towards the
oceans as a possible alternative to land disposal for both lowlevel and high-level radioactive waste disposal. Many other nations are also now using or considering the future use of this
ocean disposal alternative, particularly for their low-level radioactive waste.1
This article is intended to describe existing or prospective international legal limitations on the extent to which the United
States and other nations are precluded from using the oceans for
the disposal of radioactive waste that may drain or settle into
the seas.
I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED BY

CIVILIZED NATIONS

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice includes "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" 2 among the sources of law which that tribunal
may apply.3 Article X of the 1972 London Convention on the
* David W. Robinson Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law;
Associate, Belle W. Baruch Institute for Marine Biology and Coastal Research; Associate,
U.S.C. Institute of International Studies; A.B. 1938, DePauw University; J.D. 1952,
Northwestern University; J.S.D. 1962, Yale University.
1. R. Dyer, Sea Disposal of Nuclear Waste: A Brief History 5 (on file with Office of
Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (1980) (unpublished Report to the President prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, ch. I, art. 38, 59
Stat. 104, T.S. No. 933 [hereinafter cited as International Court Statute].
3. International Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 38, provides as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
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Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter (London Dumping Convention)4 refers to "the
principles of international law regarding State responsibility for
damage to the environment of other States or to any other matter of all kinds." 5 Borrowing from the language of T.E. Holland,
a nineteenth century publicist, these general principles are "but
private law 'writ large.'" The principles are an application,
Holland continued, "to political communities of those legal ideas
7
which were originally applied to the relations of individuals."
For the purposes of this study, the most relevant legal idea from
national law so magnified is the Latin maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas; that is, "use your own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another."" An aspect of the law
of nuisance, this rule is an important one in Anglo-American
tort law in which it is sometimes referred to as the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.9 The sic utere rule is found in corresponding
branches of other legal systems, 10 and the process of its assimilation into the body of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations may be seen in the Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel,
and Lake Lanoux decisions.
In the Trail Smelter Arbitration," air pollution emanating
from a smelter in British Columbia damaged farmland and
timberland in Washington State, and the arbitral tribunal found

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
4. Done Dec. 29, 1972, entered into force for the United States Aug. 30, 1975, 26
U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 [hereinafter cited as London Dumping Convention]. A
contracting party may withdraw from the Convention by giving six months' notice in
writing. Id. art. XXV. For an extensive discussion of the London Dumping Convention,
see notes 31-39 and accompanying text infra.
5. London Dumping Convention, supra note 4, art. X.
6. T. HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1898).
7. Id.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
9. L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868). For reception in the United States of the Rylands
rule (stated by Lord Cranworth as "sic ute non laedat alienum"), see W. PROSSER, J.
WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, ToRTs: CASES & MATERIALS 717 (1976).
10. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 346-47 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
11. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. INT'L ARE. AwARDs
1911 (1938), 1936 (1941); 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939); 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
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Canada liable to the United States because
under the principles of international law, as well as of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another State or the properties or persons
12
therein ....

After World War II, in the Corfu Channel Case,1 the International Court of Justice held, inter alia, that Albania was liable to
the United Kingdom for failure to warn of mines that exploded
and damaged British ships in Albanian waters. The International Court based its award on "certain general and well-recognized principles, 14 one of which was "every state's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other states. ' 15 In the same year as the Corfu
Channel decision, the United Nations Secretariat published a
Survey of InternationalLaw, which described the sic utere rule
as an "aspect of international law as to which there exists already a substantial body of practice" based on the "law bearing
upon the obligations of territorial sovereignty in the interest of
orderly neighborly intercourse and relations." ' Eight years
later, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration,7 an arbitral tribunal rejected Spain's objection to a unilateral decision by France to divert the waters of Lake Lanoux for use in a hydroelectric plant.
The tribunal endorsed the French position that
[a] state has the right to utilize unilaterally that part of a river
which runs through it so far as such utilization is of a nature
which will effect on the territory of another State only a limited amount of damage, a minimum of inconvenience, such as
falls within that which is implied by good neighborliness. 8

12. 3 R. INT'L Ar. AWARDS 1936, 1965 (1941).

13. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
14. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22.

15. Id. at 22.
16. Survey of InternationalLaw in Relation to the Work of Codification of the
InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/l/Rev. 1, at 34-35 (1949).
17. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957).
18. 24 I.L.R. at 124. The agreement between the United States and Canada establishing an arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States claims relating to Gut Dam provided for the arbitration of claims resulting from high water levels in Lake Ontario or
the St. Lawrence River according to the "substantive law in force in Canada and in the
United States of America" and which contains, in article I, paragraph 2(b), the provi-
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The "body of practice" referred to in the Secretariat Survey
has since been augmented by domestic legislation such as the
enactment by the United States Congress of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act1" and enactment by the Canadian Parliament of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 20 both of

which forbid the dumping at sea of, among other things, certain
radioactive wastes detrimental to man, animals, fish, or plants.
In 1955, Oppenheim described the sic utere rule as "one of
those general principles of law recognized by civilized States,"
which the World Court is bound to apply by virtue of article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 21 but cau-

tioned that the application of the still controversial doctrine is
not at all certain. He noted that the rule "is of recent origin in
the literature and practice of International Law, and [that] it
must be left to international tribunals to apply and develop the
principle by reference to individual situations. '22 Since then, in
quest of greater certainty than may be realized from claims
based on general principles, many states have entered into international agreements that prohibit or regulate the disposal of radioactive material, reduce the production of radioactive waste,
or establish guidelines for the safe use of atomic energy.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT FROM POLLUTION BY RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES

A.

Global Agreements

1. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(1956).2 3-- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was

established in 1956 to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the
world, ' 24 and to cooperate with the United Nations to establish

"standards of safety for protection of health and minimization

sion that the relevant law in the two states party to the agreement includes international
law. Agreement Establishing Gut Dam Claims Tribunal, March 25, 1965, art. I, para.
2(b), 17 U.S.T. 1567, T.I.A.S. No. 6114.
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65, 1281-92, 1311-28, 1341-45, 1361-76 (1976).
20. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 2, §§ 2,4 (1st Supp. 1970).
21. International Court Statute, supra note 2. See also note 3 supra.
22. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, at 346-47.
23. Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
24. Id. art. II (Objectives).
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of danger to life and property. . . and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operations" and to projects
or arrangements under its supervision. 2 The Agency was given
the power to "approve the means to be used for the chemical
processing of irradiated materials solely to ensure that this
processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes" and to "require that special fissionable materials
recovered or produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors .. . specified by the member or members concerned
"126

2. Convention on the High Seas (1958).27-- The First
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference met in Geneva in
1958 and negotiated four treaties, one of which is the Convention on the High Seas. Article 25 of that Convention provides:
(1) Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the
seas from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and regulations which may be formulated
by the competent international organizations. (2) All States
shall cooperate with the competent international organizations
in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
or airspace above with radioactive materials or other harmful
28
agents.
The Convention attempts to prevent pollution of the seas by establishing precautionary measures that regulate but do not ban
ocean dumping.
The United States engaged in ocean dumping operations for
twenty-five years, 1945-1970, and, during that time, three
surveys of the disposal areas arrived at approximately the same
conclusion: "within experimental error there was no radioactivity detected that exceeded background levels""12 in the sea, sea

25. Id. art. M, para. 6 (Functions).
26. Id. art. XII (Agency Safeguards).
27. Done, Apr. 29, 1958, entered into force for the United States Sept. 30, 1962, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
28. Id. art. 25.
29. R. Dyer, supra note 1 (citing E. Jones, Special Report, Waste Disposal Program
Project No. 10,000-827 of U.S. Coast Guard (1961) (special report for U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n on file with AEC; Pneumodynamics Corporation, Survey of Radioactive
Waste Disposal Sites (1961) (unpublished report on file with AEC); J. Faughn, Radiological Survey of the California Disposal Areas (1957) (unpublished report by Scripps Inst.
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bed, or living organisms where the surveys were conducted. In
1970, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued a report to President Nixon recommending that the ocean disposal
of high level radioactive waste be prohibited and that the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) not license ocean
dumping of other levels of radioactive waste "except in a very
few cases for which no practical alternative offers less risk to
man and his environment."30 Responding to the CEQ recommendations, the United States ceased disposing of nuclear waste
at sea; the AEC issued appropriate modifications of its licensing
operations and, as a matter of practice, ceased issuing permits.
The United States Congress codified the CEQ recommendations
in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972.31 All of the foregoing presaged American adherence to the
"London Dumping Convention" of 1972.2
3. London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972).3 --The
London Dumping Convention prohibits dumping certain types
of "[h]igh-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radioactive
matter"3' and requires prior special permits for dumping certain
other radioactive substances. a5 To aid in the implementation of
its objectives, the Convention further requires that a contracting
party take "appropriate measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the [Convention's] provisions . ..'"
and to apply these measures "to all vessels and aircraft in its
territory or flying [the party's] flags" and to "floating platforms
under [the party's] jurisdiction believed to be engaged in dumping,"' 37 except for those "entitled to sovereign immunity under

international law."38 Furthermore, the contracting parties are re-

of Oceanography for AEC and Office of Naval Research)).
30. COUNSEL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCEAN DUMPING: A NATIONAL POLICY ii
(1970) (Report to the President).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-02, 1411-21, 1441-44 (1976).

32. R. Dyer, supra note 1, passim.
33. London Dumping Convention, supra note 4.
34. Id. art. IV, para. 1(a) and Annex I ("the Blacklist") (6).
35. Id. Annex IID.
36. Id. art. VII, para. 2.
37. Id. art. VII, pare. 1(c).
38. Id. art. VII, para. 1. A definition of sovereign immunity is provided in article 236
of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text):
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of
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quired to cooperate with the United Nations and other international bodies in supporting parties that request assistance with
the disposal and treatment of waste and to cooperate with
"other measures to prevent or mitigate pollution caused by
dumping."3 9 Contracting parties are required to promote "measures to protect the marine environment against pollution
caused by [inter alia] ...
radioactive pollutants from all
sources, including vessels ' 40 and are required to cooperate in de-

veloping procedures for the assessment 41of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping.
Differing interpretations of the London Dumping Convention are exemplified by the attitudes of the governments of Japan and the Marianas. In 1980, the Japanese government announced that it would begin to dump radioactive waste in the
Pacific Ocean 400 miles north of the territorial waters of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. 42 On the basis of environmental and safety estimates43 of this ocean dumping program and a preoperational survey of the proposed area, the Nuclear Safety Bureau of the Science and Technology Agency of

the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other
vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a state and used, for the time being,
only on government noncommercial service. However, each State shall ensure
by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such
vessels or aircraft are operated in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable
and practical, with this Convention.
Id. See note 66 infra. Article 236 amounts to a codification of the Tate Letter (letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE
BULLETIN 984 (1952)).
39. London Dumping Convention, supra note 33, art. IX(c).
40. Id. art. XII(d).
41. Such procedures are to be developed "in accordance with principles of international law regarding State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States
or to any other area of the environment, caused by dumping of wastes and other matter
of all kinds." Id.
42. See W. DAVIs, THE PROPOSED JAPANESE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROGRAM: A
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 9 (1981) (citing JAPAN: RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT CENTER,
NUCLEAR SApTY BUREAU, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, Low-Lzvm RADIOACTIVE
WASTES: DUMPING AT THE PACIFIC (1980)).
43. W. DAVIS, supra note 42 (citing JAPAN: RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
CENTER, NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, SAFETY ON SEA-

DUMPING OF Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES (1980); JAPAN: NUCLEAR SAFETY BURAU,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT ON SEA-DUMPING

oF Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTEs (1980).
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Japan announced findings that the planned dumping would pose
no hazard to marine life, the environment, the local peoples," or
consumers of indigenous fish. The Northern Marianas government has challenged these claims in a lengthy analysis, which
concludes that the implementation of the Japanese proposal
would violate the letter and spirit of the London Dumping Convention by posing a potential health hazard to the Japanese
public, the people of Micronesia, and other consumers, 45 and by
potentially interfering with the harvest of seabed mineral resources concentrated in the abyssal basins of the North Pacific
area.4 6 The report further alleges that lack of a scientific basis
for accurately evaluating the consequences of the Japanese proposal and Japan's failure to either seriously consider land-based
storage methods or formulate measures to be taken in the event
of release of radioactivity constitute further apparent violations
of the London Dumping Convention.47
4. Conventions Defining the Liability of Nuclear Ship
Operators.
a. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Ships (1962).4 8-Each contracting state to this convention
agreed to adopt measures necessary to ensure implementation of
the Convention, which imposes liability on the operator of a nuclear ship 49 for any nuclear damage resulting from an incident
involving the ship's nuclear fuel or from radioactive products or
44. W. DAvis, supra note 42 (citing JAPAN: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, PREOPERATIONAL STUDY OF THE PROPOSED AREA FOR SEA DISPOSAL OF Low-LEvEL RADIoAcIvE
WASTES (1979); JAPAN: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, STUDY ON SOLIDIFIED WASTE
PACKAGES (1979)).
45. W. DAVIs, supra note 42, at 9. See Japanese Radioactive Dumping Plan Draws
Criticism,The State (Columbia, S.C.), May 17, 1981, at 13-A, cols. 1-6.
46. W. DAviS, supra note 42, at 10.
47. Id. at 10-13 (citing PARIS: ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECISION OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING A MULTILATERAL CONSULTATION SURVEIL(1977)).
48. Opened for signature, May 25, 1962. For partial text, see J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 433-38 (1974) (citing Records of the 1962
conference in [1963] CONFERENCE DIPOLMATIQUE DU DROrr MARITIME, lie Sess., 2e phase,
LANCE MECHANISM FOR SEA-DUMPING OF RADIOACTrIE WASTE

707-23 (Bruxelles 1962); InternationalConventions on Civil Liabilityfor Nuclear Damage, IAEA LEGAL SERIES No. 4, at 36-36 (Vienna 1966); 4 PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY,
ser. X, L. & AD., app. 1 (1966)) [hereinafter cited as "NS Convention"]. The treaty has
not been ratified. See Szasz, The Convention on the Liability of Operatorsof Nuclear
Ships, 2 J. MAR. L. CoM. 541, 550-51 (1971).
49. "Nuclear ship" is defined as "any ship equipped with a nuclear power plant."
"NS Convention," supra note 46, art. I1I(l).
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waste5" produced in the ship.51
b. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963) . 52 -The Vienna Convention imposes liability on the
operator of a nuclear installation for damage resulting from any
nuclear incident (a) in such an installation or (b) "involving nuclear material [including radioactive waste] 53 coming from or
originating in [such an] installation. . and occurring before liability has been assumed. . . by the operator of another nuclear

installation . .

.

54

c. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material (Carriage Convention)
(1971). 5 5 -This Convention was cooperatively drafted by the
IAEA and the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It
imposes exclusive liability on the operator of a nuclear installation for damage caused by "a nuclear incident occurring in the
course of maritime carriage of nuclear material" but protects
such operators from multiple liability that might arise from
overlapping provisions of national law and the Paris and Vienna
Conventions.5

50. "Radioactive products or waste" is defined as "any material, including nuclear
fuel, made radioactive by neutron irradiation incidental to the utilization of nuclear fuel
in a nuclear ship." Id. art. I, para. 6.
51. Id. art. II, para. 1.
52. May 21, 1963. For text, see Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Official Records,
InternationalConference (Vienna Apr. 29-May 19, 1963), IAEA LEGAL SERIES No. 2, at
501-12 (Vienna 1964); IAEA LEGAL SERIES No. 4, at 3-15 (Vienna 1966); IAEA LEGAL
SERIES No. 6, Annex H (Vienna 1970); reprinted in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 727 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. "Denunciation shall take effect one year after
the date on which notification to that effect has been received by the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency." Id. art. XXVI.
53. "Radioactive products or waste" is defined as "any radioactive material produced in, or any material made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incidental to,
the production or utilization of nuclear fuel, but does not include radioisotopes which
have reached the final state of fabrication so as to be usable for any scientific, medical,
agricultural, commercial, or industrial purpose." Id. art. I, para. 1(h).
54. Id. art. II, para. 1. "The liability of an operator of a nuclear installation may be
limited to not less than $5 million for any one nuclear incident." Id. art. V, para. 1.
55. Done Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 277 (1972). Any contracting party may denounce the Convention at any time, and the denunciation becomes
effective no less than one year from receipt of notification by the Secretary General of
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization. Id. art. 7.
56. Id., preamble and art. I.See notes 52 supra & 87 infra.
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5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials (1979). 5 7 -Representatives of fifty-eight states (including all permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council except the Peoples' Republic of China) and the European Atomic Energy Community met at the headquarters of the
IAEA in Vienna in November 1977, to begin drafting a convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. The final
draft of the Convention was completed and referred to governments on October 26, 1979, and was opened for signature on
March 3, 1980.11
Each state that ratifies, accepts or approves the Convention
undertakes to establish, in conformity with its national law and
with the Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials59 used for peaceful 0 purposes while in
export, import, or international transport. The latter include the
transport of such materials (a) from one site within a signatory
state to another locale within that state through international
waters, or (b) on board ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction61
More specifically, article 7 of the Convention provides that the
attempt to commit or the international commission of
an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt,
possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal [or
demand for] nuclear material and which causes or is likely to
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property shall be made 62a punishable [and extraditable]
offense under its national law.
Furthermore, the Convention requires each state party to ensure
under its national law that applicable prosecution procedures
are prompt6 3 and fair" and that penalties are commensurate
with the "grave nature" of these offenses.6 5

57. Opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 Irr'L LEGAL MATS. 1422
(1979) [hereinafter cited as N. Mat. Protection Convention].
58. 18 IN'L LEGAL MATS. at 1419-21.
59. N. Mat. Protection Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.
60. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
61. Id. arts. 1, 2, & 4.
62. Id. art. 7.
63. Id. art. 10.
64. Id. art. 12.
65. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
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6. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal
Text). 6e--The 320 articles of the Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea (Informal Text) contain no specific references to the
handling or disposal of radioactive waste or material.6 7 The text,
however, in establishing the obligation of a state "to protect and
preserve the marine environment" by taking measures "to prevent, reduce, and control pollution" 68 of that environment by various means including acts to minimize the release of noxious
substances does employ language relevant to waste disposal."
Article 194 of the Informal Text of the Draft Convention
describes states' obligations to take measures70 to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment, "using

66. Drafted at the close of the Ninth Session (Aug. 1980) of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and reproduced from U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62WP.10/Rev.
3 (Aug. 27, 1980), reprintedin 19 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1131-1294 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Draft Convention]. The President of the Law of the Sea Conference, the late Ambassador H. Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, cautioned that the draft is a negotiating text
and not a negotiated text. 19 INT'L LEGAL MATS. at 1130.
67. Delegates to the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference have explained to the author that the London Dumping Convention provides the excuse for
their avoidance of this subject. See also A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW
OF THE SEA 8, 386-87 (1981).
68. Article 1 of the Draft Convention defines "pollution of the marine environment"
as
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment (including estuaries) which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction
of amenities.
Draft Convention, supra note 66, art. 1, para. 4.
69. Id. art. 194, para. 3 provides that
[t]he measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those
designed to minimize to the fullest possible extent:
(a) Release of toxic, harmful, or noxious substances, especially those
which are persistent:
(i) from land-based sources;
(ii) from or through the atmosphere;
(iii) by dumping ....
70. Id. art. 194, para. 2, provides:
States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted that they do not cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this
Convention.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1981

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal
.
. ,M Draft article 210 expressly requires states to regulate
dumping 72 by prescribing that they must adopt their own "laws
and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the
marine environment by dumping"7' and by calling for the establishment of "global and regional rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment by dumping."7 4 The Informal Text recognizes the right of coastal states to permit, regulate, and control dumping "within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the continental shelf ....

,,71
Draft

article 216 prescribes responsibilities for the enforcement of
dumping regulations.78
Draft articles 22 and 23 provide that, when exercising the

71. Id. art. 194, para. 1.
72. Id. art. 210. The Draft Convention defines the term "dumping" as follows:
(a) "Dumping" means:
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other manmade
structures at sea.
(b) "Dumping" does not include:
(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the
normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures
at sea and their equipment, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea;
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof,
provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.
Id. art. I.
73. Id. art. 210, para. 1.
74. Id. art. 210, para. 4.
75. Id. art. 210, para. 5.
76. Draft article 216 provides:
Laws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention and applicable international rules and standards established through competent international, organizations or diplomatic conferences for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution of the marine environment by dumping shall be
enforced:
(a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or
its exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf;
(b) by the flag State with regard to vessels and aircraft flying its flag or of
its registry;
(c) by any State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter
occurring within its territory or at its off-shore terminals.
Id. art. 216.
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right of innocent passage through a territorial sea, tankers, nuclear-powered ships, and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their passage to such sealanes and trafficseparation schemes as the coastal state may designate and that
the ships "shall carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international
77
agreements."
Draft article 94 lists among the duties of signatory flag
states on the high seas the requirement that "[e]very State shall
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag;" that
"[e]very State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag
as are necessary to ensure safety at sea;" and that such measures
shall include those necessary to ensure "[t]hat the Master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable international
regulations concerning the . . . prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution .... ,,78Article 94 further requires each
state to hold an inquiry "into every marine casualty or incident
of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and
19
causing. .. serious damage.., to the marine environment. 7
Draft article 237(2) provides that the contracting parties
should carry out in a manner consistent with this Convention
any specific obligations assumed under special conventions concerning protection and preservation of the marine environment.80 This article may provide protection to workmen engaged
in the handling or disposal of radioactive waste if it is interpreted broadly enough to incorporate article five of the Convention Concerning the Protection of Workers Against Ionising Radiation (sponsored by the International Labor Organization),8 1
which states that "[e]very effort shall be made to restrict the
exposure of workers to ionising radiations to the lowest practicable level, and any unnecessary exposure shall be avoided by all

77. Id. arts. 22 & 23.

78. Id. art. 94.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 237, para. 2.
81. Adopted June 22, 1960; entered in force June 17, 1962, 431 U.N.T.S. 41.
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The Informal Text of the Draft Convention on the Law of
the Sea is suffused with additional suggestions for requirements
that states in their navigation, overflight, exploration, exploitation or research of ocean areas, act singly or cooperatively for
the "conservation of the living resources of the sea," "the protection and preservation of the marine environment," and "the prevention, reduction and control of pollution" of that
8 3
environment.

B. Regional Conventions
1. Treaty for the Establishment of the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) (1957).84 -The aim of Euratom
is "to contribute to raising the standard of living in Member
States and to development of commercial exchanges with other
countries by creation of conditions necessary for speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries."85 The obligations of
the Community include that of establishing and ensuring the application of "uniform safety standards to protect the health of
workers and of the general public."886 Article seventy-seven provides that, within the framework of the treaty's chapter on inspection, the Euratom Commission shall satisfy itself that in the
territories of member states
(a) ores, source materials, and special fissionable materials are
not diverted from their intended uses as stated by the users,
and (b) the provisions concerning supplies and any special undertaking concerning measures of control entered into by the
Community in an agreement concluded with87a third country or
an international organization are observed.
2. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field

82. Id.
83. For example, article 237, paragraph 2 of the Draft Convention incorporates obligations assumed by states under other conventions with respect to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. Draft Convention, supra note 66, art. 237, para.
2.
84. Done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (1958).
85. Id. art. 1.
86. Id. art. 2.
87. Id. art. 77.
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of Nuclear Energy (1960).es--The Paris Convention, referred to
in the Carriage Convention,"9 is a regional agreement presaging
the Carriage Convention and the other conventions protecting
against radioactive hazards described above. The Paris Convention was drafted by the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the
OECD. The agency is "charged with encouraging the elaboration
and harmonization of legislation relative to nuclear energy" in
the OECD countries. 90 The Paris Convention provides that the
operator of a nuclear installation in a contracting state shall be
liable91 for damage caused by nuclear incidents.9 2 The Convention defines "radioactive products or waste" as
any radioactive material produced in or made radioactive by
exposure to the radiation incidental to the process of producing
or utilizing nuclear fuel, but does not include 1. nuclear fuel, or
2. radioisotopes outside a nuclear installation which are used or
intended to be used for any industrial, commercial, medical or
93
scientific purpose.
3. Oslo Convention on the Control of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (1972). 9 4 -Contracting parties to the Oslo Convention agree to take all possible steps to
prevent the pollution of specified areas of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and the North Atlantic Ocean by substances that
may be harmful to human health, marine life, or amenities, or
may interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.9 5 The parties
further agree to harmonize their policies and espouse measures
to prevent the pollution of the sea by dumping from ships or
other aircraft, 9 and to refrain from all dumping "without ap7
proval of the appropriate national authority or authorities."'
88. Adopted July 29, 1960, reprinted in J. BARos & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 48, at
422 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
89. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
90. Paris Convention, supra note 88, preamble.

91. The Convention sets the maximum liability for the operation "in respect of
damages caused by a nuclear incident" at "15,000,000 European Monetary Agreement
units of account as defined at the date of this Convention." Paris Convention, supra note

88, art. 7(b).
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. preamble and art. 3.
Id. art. l(a)(iv).
Done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 262 (1972).
Id. art. 1.

96. Id. art. 4.
97. Id. art. 7.
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Despite such comprehensive language, there is no specific mention of radioactive waste in the annexes that specify the substances whose dumping is prohibited" or regulated.9 9
4. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974).' °0- Article 6 of the Baltic
Sea Convention provides that radioactive materials'0 1 "shall not
be introduced into the marine environment of the Baltic Sea
Area 02 in significant quantities without a prior special permit,
which may be periodically reviewed, by the appropriate national
authority" of the contracting parties of the region. 10 3 The Convention defines "dumping" as it is defined
in article 1 of the
04
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.1
5. Convention for the Protection of the MediterraneanSea
Against Pollution (1976).10 5-"Realizing fully the need for close
cooperation among the States and international organizations
concerned in a coordinated and comprehensive regional approach for the protection and enhancement of the Marine Environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area,"' 6 the contracting parties to the Mediterranean Convention agreed generally to take
appropriate measures "to prevent, abate, and combat pollution
in the Mediterranean Sea and to protect and enhance the
Marine Environment in that Area.' 0 7 In a protocol that is an
integral part of the Convention, the parties expressly agreed to
apply the prohibitions' o and prior special permit requirements' 09 set forth in the London Dumping Convention pursuant

98. Id., Annex I.
99. Id., Annex I.
100. Reprinted in 13 Irr'L LEGAL MATS. 546 (1974).
101. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
102. For purposes of the Convention, "the Baltic Sea Area shall be the Baltic Sea
proper with the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland and the entrance to the Baltic Sea
bounded by the parallel of the Skaw in the Skagerrak at 570 44' 8" N." and "[i]t does
not include international waters of the Contracting Parties." Id. art. 1.
103. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
104. Compare id. art. 2, para. 3 with Draft Convention, supra notes 66 & 72, art. 1.
105. Done Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 INrr'L LEGAL MATS. 290 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Mediterranean Convention]. Only Mediterrenean coastal states are signatories of
the agreement. 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. at 289.
106. Mediterranean Convention, supra note 105, preamble.
107. Id. art. 4(1).
108. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping, Feb. 16, 1976, art. 4, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 300 (1976).
109. Id. art. 5.
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to the definitions and recommendations of the competent international body, which presently is the IAEA. 110
6. Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperationon the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution
(1978). 111 -In the spring of 1978, eight states of the Persian Gulf
area 11 2 signed an agreement to take steps individually and/or
jointly for the prevention and abatement of pollution in that
area with a particular reference to pollution caused by dumping
of wastes and other matter from ships and aircraft.113 The Convention's definition of "marine pollution"'" is virtually identical
to the definition employed in the Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea (Informal Draft Text),1 5 as is a provision for sovereign immunity 16 for "[w]arships or other ships owned by' a7
State, and used only on Government noncommercial service. 1
The conference that produced the Convention also agreed on a
protocol establishing a Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center to
expedite regional cooperation in combating pollution by oil and
other harmful substances in cases of emergency. 1 8 Finally, the
conference adopted an Action Plan for the Gulf Area that calls
for ratification and implementation of relevant international
conventions" 9 including in particular the London Dumping
Convention.120 The contracting parties and the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) have recognized the Persian
Gulf region as a "concentration area" in which the UNEP and
other relevant components of the United Nations system will
play their "catalytic role" of providing assistance. 21

110. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
111. Done Apr. 24, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 511 (1978) [hereinafter

cited as Kuwait Convention].

o

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

For a description of the geographical area, see id. art. II.
Id. art. V.
See note 68 supra.
See note 66 supra.
Kuwait Convention, supra note 109, art. XIV.
Draft Convention, supra note 64, art. 236.
Protocol Concerning Regional Cooperation in Combating Pollution, Apr. 24,
1978 art. III, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 526, 528 (1978).
119. Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment
and Coastal Areas of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Omar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates, done Apr. 24, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 501

(1978).
120. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
121. Action Plan, supra note 119.
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7. Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources (1980).122
1-In this
protocol, the contracting parties to the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution "undertake to eliminate pollution of the Protocol Area from
land-based sources by substances listed in Annex I of this Protocol.

'123

Item nine of Annex I is "[r]adioactive substances, includ-

ing their wastes, when their discharges do not comply with the
principles of radiation protection as defined by the competent
international organizations, taking into account the protection of
12
the marine environment.1

4

III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS LIKELY TO REDUCE THE
AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES PRODUCED: QUALITATIVE,
QUANTITATIVE, OR GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS ON THE PRODUCTION,
TESTING, OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A.

Pre-Atomic Age DisarmamentNegotiations

The goal of the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was
that of "limiting the rapidly accelerating development of existing armaments. 1 25 The twenty-six participating states at the
first Conference and the forty-four states at the second Hague
Conference in 1907 labored and, despite other results brought
forth a disarmament mouse. Both conferences passed resolutions calling for the prohibition of the discharge of projectiles
from balloons, and the first conference also produced resolutions, not renewed in 1907, denouncing the use of asphyxiating
gases and expanding bullets. 26 World War I prevented the convening of the third Hague Peace Conference scheduled in 1915.
The Versailles Treaty, adopted at the end of World War I, imposed disarmament on vanquishe~d states-a process to be re-

peated at the termination of World War II. The Versailles
Treaty also embodied the Covenant of the League of Nations, in
which the members recognized "that the maintenance of peace
122. Approved by consensus May 16, 1980, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 869

(1980).
123. Id. art. 5.
124. Id., Annex I(a).
125. See J. SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907
(3d ed. 1918); B. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER 229-90 (1966).
126. See J. ScoTT, supra note 125; B. TUCHMAN, supra note 125.
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requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common
action of international obligations.""12 League-administered general disarmament negotiations led to the adoption of the Five
Power Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1921128 and
the London Naval Agreement of 1930.129 Further disarmament
talks foundered, however, in the middle thirties amid power
politics exemplified by the commencement of military operations in China by the Japanese in 1931 and in Ethiopia by the
Italians in 1935 and by German rearmament.
B. Post World War II DisarmamentAgreements
The first-named purpose of the United Nations is "[t]o
maintain international peace and security." 13 0 Much of the
United Nations Charter is devoted to establishing modalities for
the implementation of a security system provided for in the
Charter. 13 1 Although the Charter does not mention disarmament, the United Nations Organization soon became involved in
such negotiations and, in 1978, the General Assembly held a special session on disarmament. The Final Act of that session,
which was adopted by consensus, assigned to nuclear weapons
the highest priority for disarmament negotiations. 3 2 The Act
also called for a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests, an
end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones, and the completion of a second strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II).133

127. Done Jan. 28, 1919, pt. 1, art. 8, 2.Bevans 43, 1919 U.S. Foreign Relations:
Paris Peace Conference XIII, 82 (1947) (Senate resolution failed of adoption Nov. 19,
1919). See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION
AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS (1932-33); J. SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY AND ITS RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PARIS (1929); Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY
OF WAR (1942).

128. Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No. 671.
129. Apr. 22, 1930, 46 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 830.
130. United Nations Charter art. 1.
131. Id. arts. 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14 (General Assembly), 23-32 (Security Council), 33-48
(Pacific Settlement of Disputes), 39-51 (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression), 52-54 (Regional Arrangements), 99
(Secretariat).
132. Final Act of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarma-

ment, U.N.G.A. Res. S-10/2 (S-X), 10 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 4) 3, U.N. Doc.
A/S-10/4 (1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1016 (1978).
133. Id. at ch.

I.
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1. Early Initiatives.
a. The Baruch Plan.-One of the earliest and most farreaching calls for nuclear disarmament was presented in 1946 by
Bernard Baruch, the United States' member of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. In an unprecedented offer to
sacrifice the sovereignty of the United States, Baruch proposed
the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority
(IADA), which would have been assigned authority over the
whole field of atomic energy. The IADA would have controlled
the world's supply of raw materials needed for the production of
atomic energy, conducted all research in atomic explosives, operated or licensed all plants producing dangerous amounts of
fissionable materials and their products, and encouraged the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Commission adopted the
Baruch Plan and sent it on to the United Nations General Assembly where it met a Soviet veto. 34
b. Atoms for Peace.-On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" speech before the
United Nations General Assembly. The heart of the speech was
a proposal that the "governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence,.

. .

begin now and con-

tinue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of...
uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic
Energy Agency ...

to be set up under the aegis of the United

Nations." 135 The Atoms for Peace Plan was substantially implemented in 1957 when the IAEA began operations with the "major initial task to help member States prepare for eventual use of
nuclear power and to promote, particularly in the economically
less developed areas, the wider use of radioisotopes and radiation sources in research, industry, agriculture and medicine."136

134. Speech by Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. Representative to U.N. Atomic Energy
Commission, delivered at opening session of Atomic Energy Conference (June 14, 1946).
For the full text of the speech, see XII VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 547-51 (1946); 11
CURRENT HISTORY 133-40 (August 1946). See also Shotwell, Blueprint for an Atomic
Charter, 35 SURVEY GRAPHIC 255-57 (July 1946); M. ROSENBLOOM, PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH: BERNARD BARUCH AND A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY 255-93 (1953); J. BYRNES,
SPEAKING FRANKLY 268-73 (1947); D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 149-56 (1969).

135. Address before the U.N. General Assembly on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
Dec. 8, 1953, reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESmENT. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

1953, 813-22 (1960). See D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 251-55 (1963).
136. Summary Records of the International Atomic Energy Agency, YEARBOOK OF
TilE UNITED NATIONS: 1958 at 429 (1959).
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c. Open Skies.-At the Geneva Summit Meeting in 1955,
President Eisenhower presented to the Soviet leaders his "Open
Skies" plan pursuant to which each superpower would permit
the other to conduct continuous aerial surveillance of its military activity. Nikita Khrushchev rejected the plan the following
spring.
During the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, the
United States and the Soviet Union informally observed a suspension of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This arrangement
was shattered by the Soviets in 1962, and both powers resumed
testing until the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
1963.137

2. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963). 1 38-- By now,
more than 100 states have joined the Test Ban Treaty's original
parties-the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom-in agreeing not to conduct,
cause, encourage, or in any way participate in the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere but underground and not even there "if
such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside
the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or
control such explosion is conducted."139 It is understood that
war may annul or suspend the operation of the Treaty between
warring parties. 40
137. See C. ALEXANDER, HOLDING THE LINE 201-67 (1975); R. DIVINE, BLOWING ON
THE WIND: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DEBATE 1954-60 234-303 (1978); TO TURN THE TDE
201-07 (J. Gardner, ed. 1962).
138. Done Aug. 5, 1963, entered into force for the United States October 10, 1963,
14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 889 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Test Ban Treaty]. "Each party in exercising its national sovereignty
has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Id. art. X. Three months' notice is required. Id.
139. Id. art. I.See generally L. PAPER, THE PROMISE AND THE PERFORMANCE: THE
LEADERSHIP OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 282-87, 321-23, 337, 347 (1975); A. SCHLESINGER, A
HousE 893-99, 909-13 (1965); R. WALTHOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WH
TON, COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 157-

60 (1972).
140. It is understood that the parties are not bound by the ban while they are at
war. In a letter to Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the United States Foreign Relations
Committee, John T. McNaughton, general counsel of the Department of Defense stated:
[I]t is standard practice in treaties outlawing the use of specified weapons or
actions in time of war for the treaties to state expressly that they apply in time
of war, in order to prevent possible application of the rule that war may sus-
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3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1968). 141-Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
each party possessing nuclear weapons agreed to refrain from
transferring "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly .... ,14 These parties agreed further to refrain from
assisting, encouraging, or inducing any state not possessing nuclear weapons "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...."14
Parties not possessing nuclear weapons agreed not to accept
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or "control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. ' 144 Finally, each party not possessing nuclear weapons agreed to accept safeguards to verify compliance

with treaty provisions.
On September 17, 1976, the IAEA Board of Governors ap-

proved the Agreement and Protocol between the United States
of America and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in

pend or annul the operation of treaties between the warring parties. (Cf. Karmuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236-39; Oppenheim's "International
Law" Vol. H, 7th ed., pp. 202-306.) ....

In his speech of July 26, 1963, President Kennedy stated that the treaty
"will not restrict their (nuclear weapons) use in time of war." See New York
Times, July 27, 1963, page 2 column 1. Significantly, this construction was not
unilateral. Earlier, on July 2, Mr. Khrushchev in Berlin expressed a similar
understanding ....
109 Cong. Rec. S-16009-10 (1963).
141. Done July 1, 1968, entered into force for the United States Mar. 5, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as Non-Proliferation
Treaty]. A three-month withdrawal provision in article 4 of this treaty is identical to the
withdrawal provision in the Text Ban Treaty. See note 138 supra. For IAEA guidelines
on safeguards agreements under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
885 (1971). For the text of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1061
(1975). See M. SHAKER, THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
A STUDY BASED ON THE FIvE PRINCIPLES oF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2028
(XX) (1976); L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 196369 462, 475-81 (1971).
142. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 141, art. I.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the United States.146 Implementation of the Agreement is provided for by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.147 Senator John Glenn of Ohio, the chief sponsor of this Act, has
warned of the limitations of international safeguards that do not
guarantee against diversion of nuclear materials. Instead, he explains, "they are designed to detect [diversion of nuclear materials] early enough so that the international community can take
appropriate (though unspecified) action to prevent the actual
construction of weaponry. The phrase 'timely warning' is used to
denote this concept, and is key to successful Non-Proliferation
Treaty/IAEA operation.'

48

Suggesting to President Reagan that

he plan a world nuclear energy policy conference and reopen the
nuclear suppliers' conference, Senator Glenn issued the following caveat:
It will not be easy to reverse the disastrous trend that began
with the rejection of the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations

[forerunner of the Baruch Plan 149 ] at the end of World War II,

was accelerated by the well-intentioned Atoms-for-Peace program, [150 ] was slowed to some extent between 1976 and 1978

and which has picked up speed again in the aftermath of backtracking by executive branch officials since 1978 ....1
On July 16, 1981, President Reagan announced basic guidelines to reinforce the nation's longstanding nonproliferation
objectives. The guidelines include seeking international agreement on "requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in
a non-nuclear-weapons state as a condition for any significant
new nuclear supply commitment." 52
146. Draft Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of

America, United States-International Atomic Energy Commission, reprinted in 16
INT'L LEGAL MATs. 25 (1976). Protocol to the Agreement, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. at 50.
147. 92 Stat. 120 (codified in scattered sections of 22 & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. H 1978). A
legislative history of the Act appears at 17 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 220 (1978). See generally
B. BosKEY & M. WILLRICH, NucLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL (1970);
STANLEY FOUNDATION, STRATEGY FOR PEAcE 26-32 (1980).

148. J. Glenn, Nuclear Traffic, Toward Better Controls, Washington Post, June 29,
1981, § A, at 13, col. 1.
149. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 135 & 136 and accompanying text supra.
151. Washington Post, supra note 148, § A, at 13, col. 2.
152. 17 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DocuMENTs 768-70 (July 20, 1981).
The President also pledged the United States' support for "IAEA programs and other
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The efficacy of the safeguard system was subjected to scrutiny during United Nations Security Council debates that led to
the unanimous adoption of a resolution condemning Israel's military attack on Iraq. 153 That resolution expressed full awareness
"that Iraq has been a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
since it came into force in 1970; that in accordance with that
treaty Iraq has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities; and that the agency has testified that these safeguards
have been satisfactorily applied to date." The resolution further
recognized "the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq, and all other
states, especially the developing countries, to establish programs
of technological and nuclear development to develop their economy and industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with their
present and future needs and consistent with the internationally
accepted objectives of preventing nuclear weapons
'
proliferation."154
During debate on the resolution, Yuhuda Blum, the Israeli
delegate to the United Nations, stressed the inadequacies and
weaknesses in the NPT safeguard system and noted that the
Treaty "is written in such a way that a violation does not technically occur until nuclear material-uranium or plutonium-is diverted from its approved use" and that the IAEA safeguards
"are focused on nuclear fuels, but not on facilities where fuel is
not present."'155
4. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(1971-72).-The four treaties commonly known as "SALT I"
provide for (1) the undertaking by the parties "to notify each
other immediately in the event of accidental, unauthorized or
any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation
of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of
nuclear war;'

156

(2) the creation of a "Hot Line" between the

international cooperative efforts in the areas of nuclear safety and environmentally
sound nuclear waste management." Id. at 770.
153. New York Times, June 20, 1981, at 4, cols. 1-4.
154. Text of U.N. Draft Resolution on Raid, New York Times, June 19, 1981, at 6,
col. 4.
155. Excerpts from Speech of Israeli U.N. Delegate, New York Times, June 20,
1981, at 4, col. 2.
156. Agreements on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War,
United States-U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/4

24

1981]

Haimbaugh: Protecting
the SeasTHE
fromSEAS
Nuclear Pollution
PROTECTING

heads of state of the two countries;"' (3) an undertaking "not to
deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems for defense of an individual region" except that each nation may deploy two systems as especially provided for in the Treaty;1 58 and (4) an undertaking not to start construction of "additional fixed landbased intercontinental ballistic missile launchers ....,,159
5. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Agreements.' 0-Although
nuclear weapons-free zones are under discussion and may exist
de facto in other areas, present agreements establish such zones
in the Antarctic, 61 in outer space, 62 in Latin America, 63 and on

57.

157. Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications
Link, United States-U.S.S.R., done Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7186

(updating Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, United States-U.S.S.R., done June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S.
No. 5362 (1963)).

158. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, done May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty]. See also Protocol to the ABM Treaty, signed
May 26, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
159. Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United
States-U.S.S.R., done May 26, 1972, expired Oct. 3, 1977, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No.
7504, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 791 (1972).
160. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE
ZONES, OP/585-77-35964-Aug., 1977-13M.
161. Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71. Article XII provides for withdrawal under certain circumstances after two
years. Id. art. XII.
162. Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, done Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. Any party to the treaty may withdraw from it one year after giving notice of intent to withdraw to the depositary governments. Id. art. XVI. A somewhat redundant Draft Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (not as yet in force) emerged in a REPORT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CoMmITrEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, 34 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 3, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 Annex 11 (1979).
163. Treaty of Tlatelolco, done Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281. See Robinson, The
Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Latin American Nuclear FreeZone, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 282,
293-306 (1970). On July 16, 1981, President Reagan announced that he would "promptly
seek the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco." 17 WEEKLY COMPI.ATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 769 (July 20, 1981).
Parties to Protocol I agree to denuclearize (for warlike purposes) those territories for
which, de jure or de facto, they are intentionally responsible and which lie within the
Latin American Zone defined by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 6 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 269. See
also Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of February 14, 1967 regarding the prohibition
of nuclear weapons in Latin America, done Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 745, T.I.A.S. 7137,
634 U.N.T.S. 364. Non-Latin American states that are party to the Protocol include
France, the People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the
United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9136, TREATIES IN FORCE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY
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the seabed and subsoil underlying the high seas.164 Common to
all four nuclear weapons-free zone agreements is the proscription of nuclear weapons.16 5 The agreements concerning Antarctica, Latin America, and outer space specify that the subject areas may be used only for peaceful purposes.166' The Antarctic

Treaty expressly proscribes nuclear weapons testing by the parties, and the agreements concerning Latin America and the
ocean floor expressly prohibit nuclear weapons testing or
1 67

storage.

IV.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Customary international law comprises the general practices
that states in their mutual relations generally and consistently
follow with an acknowledgement or acceptance of a binding obligation. It does not include those discretionary observances or
practices to which states adhere only for reasons of humanity,
comity, grace, courtesy, good will, concession, experimentation,
convenience, utility, political expediency, safety, mutual accommodation, or random reciprocal tolerance. A rule need not have
the express support of every member of the world community to
be recognized as customary international law; it must, however,
receive a widespread and representative acceptance without significant protest, especially from states affected by the application of the rule. In the few decades during which nations have
faced problems of handling and disposing of radioactive wastes,
little or no customary international law has crystallized to define
the authority of states to deal with these problems.1 68
1, 1980, at 327 (1980). See Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Latin American
Nuclear-Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 293-306 (1970). A Draft Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation was signed at Brasilia, July 3, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
1045 (1978). The contracting parties "agree to undertake joint action and efforts to promote [inter alia] the harmonious development of their respective Amazonian territories
in such a way that these joint actions produce equitable and mutually beneficial results
and achieve also the preservation of the environment, and the conservation and rational
utilization of the natural resources of those territories." Id. art. I.
164. Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons in the Seabed,
done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
165. See notes 161-164 supra.
166. See notes 161-163 supra.
167. See notes 161, 163 & 164 supra.
168. Compare the following scholarly and judicial opinions:
1. Corbett has distinguished customs acknowledged to be binding from discretionary
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In a dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Tests case,16 9 Judge
Petren noted the avoidance by the International Court of Justice of the question of "whether atmospheric tests of nuclear
weapons are, generally speaking, already governed by norms of

observances or habitual practices entered into for reasons of convenience, utility or
safety. P. CoRBErr, CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1909).
2. McDougal has observed that those authoritative decision-makers-both national
and international-authorized to create and apply a common public order "honor each
other's unilateral claims to the use of the world's seas not merely by explicit agreements
but also by mutual tolerances-expressed in countless decisions in foreign offices, national courts, and national legislatures-which create expectations that effective power
will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of patterns." McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the InternationalLaw of the Sea," 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 358
(1955).
3. DeVisscher has distinguished between customs by which governments hold themselves bound and mere adventitious practices often dictated by consideration of expediency and individualistic motivation, which are therefore devoid of definite legal signficance. C. DEVIsSCHER, THEORY

AND

REALITY

IN

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW

154-157 (rev.

ed. Corbett translation, 1968).
4. In the Scotia Case, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the [customary] law of the sea. It is
of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it
has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.
Id. at 188-89.
5. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), Mr. Justice Gray of the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the general assent or consent of civilized nations
for a period of a hundred years to a practice which originally may have rested in comity,
courtesy, concession, humanity or mutual accommodation or convenience was amply sufficient to enable such practice to grow into a settled rule of international law. See id. at
686-718.
6. In the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. 266, the International Court
of Justice based its decision on a failure to find "any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule.. . ." Id. at 277. Instead, the Court found
that practice in the area was not constant but "much influenced by considerations of
political expediency in the various cases.. .

."

Id.

7. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 4, it was stated for
a majority of the International Court of Justice that
[a]lthough the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on
the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might
be, a State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of
the provision invoked;--and should moreover have occurred in such a way as
to show a general recognition that the rule of law or legal obligation is
involved.
Id. at 43.
169. New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 161 (Petren, J., dissenting).
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international law, or whether they do not still belong to a highly
political domain where the norms concerning their international
legality are still in the gestation stage." 170 Judge Petren adopted
the latter conclusion in a separate opinion citing the "example of
China when it exploded a very powerful bomb in the atmosphere" as being "sufficient to demolish the contention that
there is at present a rule of customary international law prohibiting atmospheric nuclear tests."171
V.

SUMMARY

Although the maxim, "use your own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another" has been held to be
among the principles of law recognized by civilized nations, its
application by international tribunals has been too recent and
spotty to afford reliable guidance about whether its scope is
broad enough to encompass injuries alleged to have resulted
from the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea or the mishandling
of radioactive substances. Relevant customary international law
is even less developed at the present time.
The United States is currently bound, with regard to those
under its jurisdiction, by terminable international agreements
that (1) prohibit dumping at sea of high-level radioactive wastes
by those under its jurisdiction; (2) require prior special permits
for the dumping at sea of other levels of radioactive waste and
matter, with issuance of such permits conditioned on careful
consideration of the effects of disposal on the marine environment; (3) prohibit dumping of any radioactive waste in Antarctica and probably in outer space; (4) require cooperation with
competent international organizations and other states in the
formulation of minimal international standards for the implementation of waste disposal regulations; and (5) limit the production, testing, use, or sale of nuclear weapons. Many of these
obligations with regard to radioactive wastes would be inferentially reinforced by the adoption of any of the numerous provisions for protecting and preserving the marine environment in-

170. Id. at 161.
171. Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 306.
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cluded in the present negotiating text of the Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference.*

* This article is a final contribution to Symposium: Nuclear Waste Management,
32 S.C.L. Rav. 639-941 (1981).
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